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I. INTRODUCTION
In the old days, speakers in notable First Amendment cases sought to express
public opposition to dominant norms, whether from the perspective of anaichists
and socialists on the left or Nazis and Ku Klux Klan members on the right, and
constitutional protection for such political protest is now mostly uncontroversial.
Free speech issues grow more divisive as they move away from paradigm cases
of political dissent. Last Term, the speakers who brought First Amendment
challenges to the Supreme Court included a Playboy cable channel, a nude
dancing establishment called Kandyland, a state political candidate, and sidewalk
anti-abortion protestors. All lost except Playboy, which succeeded in invalidating
a federal statute requiring the scrambling of sexually explicit programming.' The
Court rejected free speech challenges to a state public nudity ban that prohibited
nude erotic dancing,2 a state campaign finance regulation that limited the amount
of contributions to state political candidates,3 and a state statute that restricted
speakers' unbidden approaches to people entering and exiting health care
facilities, including abortion clinics. '
First Amendment claimants fared better at vindicating the rights of expressive
associations to disassociate from members they would rather not have: The Court
upheld the right of the Boy Scouts to eject a gay scoutmaster' and the right of
California political parties to exclude from their primary elections cross-over
voters who were not registered party members.6 But the Court also held that
students at public universities do not have a First Amendment right to disassociate
from ideologically controversial student organizations by withholding portions of
mandatory student activity fees. 7
*. Dean, Richard E. Lang Professor, and Stanley Morrison Professor, Stanford Law School.
I. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000).
2. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
3. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
4. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000).
5. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2449 (2000).
6. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402, 2414 (2000).
7. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000).
II. THE FREE SPEECH CASES
A. Cable Smut
Sexually explicit speech that the Court deems indecent, but not obscene, has
long occupied a First Amendment netherworld-it is not formally unprotected, but
it does not receive the respect accorded other protected speech. The cases have
been complicated by the Court's ambivalent attitude toward speech sent via
electronic media such as airwaves and telephone. In prior cases, the Court has
suggested that government may effect time-channeling and place-channeling
regulations to protect listeners from smut but may not institute a total ban. Thus,
the Court upheld the FCC's time limitations on the use of the "seven dirty words"
in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation8 but struck down a total ban on indecent but non-
obscene "dial-a-porn" services in Sable Communications v. FCC.9 The Court
reasoned that radio and television are unusually assaultive, pervasive, and
accessible to children,'0 but calling services requiring use of a credit card are
not."
Application of these precedents to cable television has been ambiguous. The
Court has resisted classifying cable as a form of broadcasting, admitting that
viewers have more power to avoid unwanted cable programming than broadcast
programming, as well as the power to customize cable content to their own liking.
At the same time, the Court has upheld some cable restrictions aimed at indecent
sexual content. In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC (DAETC), for example, a fragmented court, led by Justice Breyer in
part, applied Pacifica to the medium of cable television, holding that the First
Amendment permits government to authorize cable operators to decline to show
indecent sexual programming on leased access channels. However, the Court
held that the First Amendment permits government neither to authorize cable
operators to decline to show indecent sexual programming on public access
channels nor to require that if smut is shown on leased access channels, it must
be segregated and scrambled so that viewers must affirmatively opt in by
requesting to see it.'2 Several justices in DAETC would have gone all the way in
one direction or the other. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas favored upholding all three regulations, reinforcing the speech rights of
cable operators, '" while Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg favored invalidating all
8. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
9. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
10. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
1I. Sable, 492 U.S. at 13 1.
12. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 755-57 (1996).
13. Id. at 812-38 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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three regulations as violations of the speech rights of cable programmers and
viewers. 4
In United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,5 the Court tilted in a
direction closer to Justice Kennedy's approach in DAETC than to that of Justice
Breyer. By a vote of five-to-four, the Court in Playboy invalidated provisions of
a federal telecommunications law that required cable operators either to fully
scramble sexually explicit programming or, if they were unable to do so because
of "signal bleed,"' 6 to confine such programming to late-night hours when
children were unlikely to view it.' 7 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy,joined
by Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, held the law subject to strict
scrutiny on the grounds that it was content-based and that its time-channeling
requirement significantly restricted cable operators' speech, even though it did not
impose a complete prohibition: "The distinction between laws burdening and
laws banning speech is but a matter of degree. The Government's content-based
burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based bans.'" 8
Justice Kennedy distinguished as "irrelevant" several earlier zoning cases that
permitted regulation of adult theaters,' 9 writing that "the lesser scrutiny afforded
regulations targeting the secondary effects of crime or declining property values
has no application to content-based regulations targeting the primary effects of
protected speech."2" Justice Kennedy likewise distinguished earlier broadcasting
cases such as Pacifica, reasoning that cable systems, unlike broadcasters, "have
the capacity to block unwanted channels on a household-by-household basis" and
that "targeted blocking is less restrictive than banning ...."2
Applying strict scrutiny, Justice Kennedy wrote: "When a plausible, less
restrictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech restriction, it is the
Government's obligation to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to
achieve its goals. The Government has not met that burden here." 2 Justice
Kennedy found such an alternative in a different provision of the law requiring
cable operators to block undesired channels at individual households upon request
and rejected, at least without a better record, a variety of government arguments
14. Id. at 780-812 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting
in par).
15. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
16. Signal bleed is aphenomenon in which, because of imprecise or inadequate scrambling, "either or
both audio and visual portions of the scrambled programs might be heard or seen .... Id. at 806.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 812.
19. See infra notes 38-39.
20. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 816.
as to why such voluntary blocking might be ineffective. 23
Justice Scalia dissented on the ground that lesser scrutiny should apply to
regulation of commercial exploitation of sexual speech,24 a proposition that
Justice Stevens disputed in a separate concurring opinion.25 Justice Thomas
concurred separately to express the view that the government might regulate
much sexual cable programming as obscene under the Miller test,26 but that its
attempt to regulate merely indecent sexual speech on cable was not defensible.
2 7
Justice Breyer, the author of the pivotal opinion in DAETC, dissented in
Playboy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia. 2
Justice Breyer concluded that the voluntary opt-out provision was not a "similarly
practical and effective[] way to accomplish [the time channeling provision's]
child-protecting objective" 29 and argued for applying a First Amendment narrow
tailoring standard that would afford "a degree of leeway ... for the legislature
when it chooses among possible alternatives in light of predicted comparative
effects. "3 °
The core issue in Playboy was which default rule should apply when
unwilling listeners or viewers might wish to avoid offensive speech: May
government require the speaker to ensure that the listener or viewer affirmatively
opts in, as a scrambling requirement does, or may the speech be made available
unless and until the listener or viewer opts out, as does a law requiring cable
operators to scramble a live signal at a viewer's request?3' In cases involving the
mails (Lamont v. Postmaster General of the United States32 and Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp.33), the Court held opt-in regimes unconstitutional, reasoning
that those wishing to avoid Communist propaganda or condom ads should take a
"'short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can"' rather than have the
government preempt such mailings in advance.34 Playboy, in one sense, simply
extended this principle about home privacy to the cable context: the Court
reasoned that the government had the less restrictive alternative of protecting
children from cable smut by requiring targeted blocking at viewers' request.35 In
23. Id.
24. Id. at 831 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 828-29 (Stevens, J., concurring).
26. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting forth a three-prong obscenity test).
27. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 829-31 (Thomas, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 835-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 840 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 841.
31. Id. at 806-07.
32. 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (striking down a federal law under which "communist political propaganda"
of overseas origin sent through the mail would be destroyed unless the recipient affirmatively requested that
the postal service deliver it).
33. 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (striking down a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited
advertisements for contraceptives).
34. Id. at72 (quoting Lamont v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880,883 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)).
35. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 824-27.
726
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this respect, the reasoning resembled that in the Court's ruling striking down the
Communications Decency Act's limitation on indecent speech over the Internet
in Reno v. ACLU, holding that filtering software or other defensive measures were
adequate alternatives to requiring that Internet users take special steps to opt into
sexual websites.3 6 But the extension of this opt-out default to the cable context
was in another sense a surprise, because DAETC had suggested that cable
resembles traditional broadcast media more than the Internet does: cable involves
"push" rather than "pull" technology and is accessible to children over the same
box as broadcast television.37 Playboy may signal a trend toward a multimedia
First Amendment, in which the Court's historical partial First Amendment
dispensation for broadcasting increasingly withers and dies-particularly once
future technologies give consumers of on-air broadcasting the capacity to
customize their television viewing and to filter out objectionable content more
easily.
A second surprise in the Playboy ruling involved the Court's strict scrutiny
and ultimate invalidation of a law that burdened but did not ban sexually explicit
but non-obscene speech. In previous "erogenous zoning "01 cases, such as Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.39 and Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,40 the
Court had counted a lesser degree of burden as a mitigating factor, upholding laws
that restricted such speech or made it less practical without banning that speech.
The majority discounted this distinction in Playboy, again subjecting indecent
speech to the usual First Amendment default rules. 4" The decision is also noted
for coalitions perhaps unexpected in a sexual speech case: President Clinton's
appointee, Justice Breyer, joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor
and Scalia in dissent, while President Bush's appointee, Justice Thomas (who, in
the Term's other sexual speech case, discussed below, joined the majority to
uphold a ban on nude dancing), here joined the speech-protective majority. 42
B. Nude Dancing
36. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 854 (1997).
37. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,743-45 (1996).
38. This bon mot is Laurence Tribe's. See Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 954
(2d ed. 1988).
39. 427 U.S. 50,72-73 (1976) (upholding a Detroit ordinance banning operation of adult theaters and
bookstores within 1,000 feet of any other such establishment, or within 500 feet of any residential area).
40. 475 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1986) (upholding a law banning adult theaters within 1000 feet of any
residential zone, dwelling, church, park, or school).
41. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000).
42. Id. at 805.
Does the First Amendment protect the right to dance for an audience sans
pasties and G-string? The Court has now twice held that nude erotic dancing
counts at least barely as speech, but that it is nonetheless regulable by means of
public nudity bans. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., the Court upheld an Indiana
public indecency statute enforced against go-go dancers at the Kitty Kat Lounge
but fragmented messily over the applicable standard of review:4 3 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, applied the intermediate
scrutiny of the O'Brien test" but held the statute adequately justified by an
important government interest in public morality.45 Justice Souter agreed that
O'Brien applied but found the statute justified instead as preventing "secondary
effects" such as prostitution and other vice crimes.46 Justice Scalia concurred in
the judgment, asserting that no First Amendment scrutiny ought apply at all since
the statute was aimed at the conduct of nudity, whether expressive or not.47
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented in
Barnes, reasoning that strict scrutiny should have applied because the only
possible motive for stopping nude dancing before consenting adults was to short-
circuit the communicative impact of erotic titillation. 4
Barnes was apparently so confusing that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
a similar subsequent case, refused to follow any of the Barnes opinions, finding
"no clear precedent," and "no point on which a majority of the Barnes Court
agreed."49 Employing strict scrutiny, the state court upheld the free speech right
of an establishment called Kandyland to feature totally nude erotic dancing by
women. 50 The state court reasoned that the law was not content-neutral but rather
sought to "impact negatively on the erotic message of the dance." "'
In City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., the Supreme Court reversed and upheld the
statute.52 The Court again fragmented in its reasoning, but this time the vote
against nude dancing was six-to-three.53 Justice O'Connor, writing a plurality
opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer,
found, as had the plurality in Barnes, that government restrictions on public
nudity should be evaluated under the O'Brien test as content-neutral restrictions
on symbolic conduct. 54 She rejected any reading of the Erie ordinance as content-
43. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560.567-68 (1991).
44. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (enunciating a four-part test for review
of government regulations that have merely an incidental effect on protected speech).
45. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567-68.
46. Id. at 582.
47. Id. at 572.
48. Id. at 593-96.
49. Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 278 (Pa. 1998).
50. Id. at 280.
51. Id. at 279.
52. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M, 529 U.S. 277, 283 (2000) (plurality opinion).
53. Id. at 282.
54. Id. at 296.
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based, finding it instead aimed at "combat[ing] the negative secondary effects
associated with nude dancing establishments, 55 such as the promotion of
"'violence, public intoxication, prostitution and other serious criminal activity.'- 5 6
Justice O'Connor found this justification sufficient to satisfy O'Brien, even in the
absence of a specific evidentiary record of such secondary effects within the city
of Erie itself. "
Justice Scalia, this time joined by Justice Thomas, concurred only in the
judgment, reiterating his view that a public nudity law such as Erie's is a "general
law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression" and thus
subject to no First Amendment scrutiny at all. 5' He expressed disdain for the
Court's "secondary effects" rationale: "I am highly skeptical, to tell the truth, that
the addition of pasties and g-strings will at all reduce the tendency of establish-
ments such as Kandyland to attract crime and prostitution, and hence to foster
sexually transmitted disease." 9
Justice Souter filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, stating that he would have vacated and remanded for more evidence.' He
again argued that O'Brien was the right test and secondary effects the right
justification,6 but he now insisted that the government should have to prove such
effects rather than merely assert them by hypothesis: "[Ilntermediate scrutiny
requires a regulating government to make some demonstration of an evidentiary
basis for the harm it claims to flow from the expressive activity, and for the
alleviation expected from the restriction imposed."'62 He found the evidentiary
record in the case "deficient" under this standard, finding not facts but "emotional-
ism" in the statements made by city council members.63 Justice Souter took the
unusual step of confessing error about his own prior failure to demand an
evidentiary basis for the law in Barnes, pleading, in the words of Samuel Johnson,
"'Ignorance, sir, ignorance." 64
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, opposing the
plurality's extension of the "secondary effects" test from the Court's earlier
erogenous zoning cases to what he characterized as an impermissible "total ban"
55. Id. at 291.
56. Id. at 297.
57. Id. at 296-302.
58. Id. at 307-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 310.
60. Id. at 310-11 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 313.
63. Id. at 314.
64. Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
on a medium of expression. 65 Echoing Justice Scalia's hunch, but to opposite
effect, he also criticized the plurality's lenient application of that test: "To believe
that the mandatory addition of pasties and a G-string will have any kind of
noticeable impact on secondary effects requires nothing short of a titanic surrender
to the implausible."'
Three observations are worth noting in Pap's. First, the Court continues to
carve out, de facto, a less-than-fully protected First Amendment status for erotic
but non-obscene speech. The Court uses the rationale of content-neutral
"secondary effects" to uphold otherwise content-based statutes whose political
counterparts would readily be struck down; no one, for example, would sustain a
ban on political rallies because they tend to be associated with litter and fistfights.
Second, by converging on the secondary effects rationale in Pap's, the Court
abandoned, apparently as an isolated anomaly, the view that morality alone was
a good enough content-neutral reason to uphold a regulation of speech; morality
may be a good enough reason to prohibit sex (as in Bowers v. Hardwick67) but not
to stop its arousal through expression. Third, the Court was cavalier toward the
empirical record of harm underlying this prohibition of sexual speech, in contrast
to other areas such as the regulation of commercial speech, in which it has
interpreted even intermediate scrutiny to require strong evidence that the
government's justification is powerful and genuine-a point emphasized by Justice
Souter in his partial dissent.
C. Campaign Finance
As controversy about political money swirled around the election year, the
Court gave no comfort to those who would deregulate campaign finance through
the force of the First Amendment, but also made no new law to encourage those
who would seek permission to enact additional campaign finance reform. Recall
that in its decision in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court split the difference between
treating campaign spending as more like voting, in which case government may
intervene to promote equality among citizens, or more like speech, in which case
it may not.68 The Court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate limits on political
expenditures by candidates or their supporters acting independently of their
campaigns69 but used modified heightened scrutiny to uphold ceilings on the dollar
amounts of campaign contributions.7' The Court reasoned that the only plausible
justification for expenditure limits was sheer redistribution of speaking power,
which it deemed impermissible in the marketplace of ideas, even if such
65. Id. at 319 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 323.
67. 478 U.S. 186(1986).
68. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 39-59.
70. Id. at 23-36.
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governmentally induced transfers are permissible in other markets.7' However, the
Court also suggested that contribution limits could permissibly be justified as
limiting the actuality or appearance of "corruption," by which the Court meant
disproportionate influence or the exchange of a political quid pro quo.7"
Buckley steered between two poles of the policy debate: whether to treat all
restrictions on political money as restrictions on speech and invalidate them unless
justified by empirically powerful demonstrations that they avert serious harm, or
to defer to all restrictions on political money as mere market regulations. The last
time the Court reviewed a campaign finance law before the October 1999 Term,
it invalidated an expenditure limit. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee v. FEC, by a vote of seven-to-two, the Court held that political parties,
like individuals, candidates, and political action committees, have a First
Amendment right to make unlimited expenditures so long as their actions are
independent of any candidate's campaign.73 In that case, only Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg would have permitted broad expenditure limits to "level the electoral
playing field";74 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas would have held a party's campaign expenditures constitutionally
protected whether independent of a campaign or frankly coordinated with it,
75
while Justices Breyer, O'Connor, and Souter viewed independent expenditures as
protected, suggesting, without deciding, that coordinated expenditures might well
be subject to permissible regulation as de facto contributions.76
This Term, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the Court upheld
a contribution limit against First Amendment challenge.77 The majority strongly
adhered to its Buckley methodology, reinforcing its distinction between expendi-
tures and contributions, over the dissent of three Justices who would have
abandoned that distinction in favor of greater First Amendment scrutiny of all
government efforts in this area, whether regulations of expenditures or contribu-
tions.78 The case involved a challenge to Missouri's limits on contributions to
candidates for state office.79 A candidate for state auditor challenged the $1,075
limit on any individual contribution for that office, arguing that even if the $1,000
71: Id. at 48-49.
72. Id. at 26-27.
73. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604,608 (1996).
74. Id. at 609 (plurality opinion by Breyer, J.) (describing the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
as designed "to level the electoral playing field by reducing campaign costs").
75. Id. at 626-31 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 631-44
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
76. Id. at 623-26 (plurality opinion).
77. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
78. See id.
79. Id.at381.
contribution limits on contributions to federal candidates that were upheld in
Buckley were constitutional, inflation had eroded the value of such a sum in the
quarter century that had elapsed, and such a limit was too restrictive to be
constitutional today.' The Court rejected his argument.8'
Writing for the six-Justice majority, Justice Souter, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, reiterated that
contribution limits are subject to considerably greater deference than expenditure
limits when challenged under the First Amendment and will survive if "closely
drawn" to a "sufficiently important interest,"82 such as prevention of corruption
and the appearance of corruption.83 He went on to reject the challengers'
argument that the state must adduce strong and particularized empirical evidence
of such corruption or its appearance in order to withstand First Amendment
review: "The state statute is not void .... for want of evidence .... Buckley
demonstrates that the dangers of large, corrupt contributions and the suspicion
that large contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor implausible." 84
Justice Souter also rejected the argument that the $1,075 limit was too low
in terms of real purchasing power to be constitutional under Buckley: "In
Buckley, we specifically rejected the contention that $1,000, or any other amount,
was a constitutional minimum below which legislatures could not regulate ....
We asked [instead] whether the contribution limitation was so radical in effect as
to render political association ineffective,"85 which Justice Souter subsequently
found not to be true of Missouri's regulation. 86 Justices Stevens and Breyer filed
separate concurrences. 
87
Justice Kennedy dissented, emphasizing that Buckley's "wooden" distinction
between contributions and expenditures has had "adverse, unintended conse-
quences" that perversely drive political money away from candidates who are
accountable to the electorate and toward secondary and tertiary speakers who are
not.88 He explained that Buckley "has forced a substantial amount of political
speech underground, as contributors and candidates devise ever more elaborate
methods of avoiding contribution limits, limits which take no account of rising
campaign costs," citing "soft money" that may be contributed to political parties
in unlimited amounts, and "issue advocacy," or advertisements that promote or
attack a candidate's positions without specifically urging his or her election or
defeat, as two examples, concluding that Buckley "has given us covert speech.
80. Id. at381-84.
81. Id. at 394-96.
82. Id. at 387-88.
83. Id. at 388-89.
84. Id. at 391.
85. Id. at 397.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 398-99 (Stevens, J., concurring), 399-405 (Breyer, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 406-07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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This mocks the First Amendment."8 9 He would have overruled Buckley and
"free[d] Congress or state legislatures to attempt some new reform .... "9
Justice Thomas also dissented, joined by Justice Scalia.9' He described as a
"curious anomaly" the majority's willingness to give less protection to campaign
contributions than to other forms of speech less central to the political process,
such as flag-burning and smut.92  He questioned Buckley's contribution-
expenditure distinction, stating that "the Constitution leaves it entirely up to
citizens and candidates to determine who shall speak, the means they will use, and
the amount of speech sufficient to inform and persuade. ,93 Finally, he criticized
the majority for, in effect, lowering the standard of scrutiny applied to contribu-
tion regulations, suggesting that it had "permit[ted] vague and unenumerated
harms to suffice as a compelling reason for the government to smother political
speech," and argued that the Missouri law should have been subject to strict
scrutiny, which it could not survive. 
94
Nixon makes clear that there is no majority on the current Court to shift
toward either pole of the campaign finance debate: Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and
Thomas evidently lack the two additional votes they would need to invalidate
contribution limits as free speech violations-even losing the Chief Justice's vote
this time round-and there is no sign that Justices Stevens or Ginsburg have picked
up three additional votes for lifting First Amendment strictures on expenditure
limits. The Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer appear
content to leave the expenditure-contribution distinction intact.
Nixon also suggests that the degree of scrutiny the Court will give to
government justifications for contribution limits is more deferential than in other
areas where it applies heightened review. Whereas the Court has tightened the
demand for strong empirical demonstration of government interests in other areas,
such as review of commercial speech regulations95 or market-structuring
regulations like cable must-carry rules,96 the majority in Nixon accepted without
the slightest further inquiry the state's recordless assertion that campaign donors
who contributed the equivalent of $383 in 1976 dollars could be counted as
political fat cats or apparent fat cats for purposes of limiting disproportionate
political influence.
89. Id. (citations omitted).
90. Id. at 409.
91. Id. at 410-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 412.
93. Id. at 420.
94. Id. at 424-25.
95. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
96. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
Justice Souter's readiness in Nixon to accept a legislative judgment
unsupported by particular empirical evidence is particularly striking given his
vocal skepticism towards the majority's empirical justification for the "secondary
effects" rationale used to uphold the City of Erie's nude dancing ban, considered
in the same Term. His willingness to accept regulations on political money with
less skepticism than regulations on sexual speech cannot be based on valuing the
former speech less than the latter. Perhaps what Justice Souter is really acting on
is a belief that a requirement of empirical evidence is useful, not for evaluating
the technical wisdom of a legislative judgment on speech regulation, but rather
for smoking out improper motives behind the statute In that case, given a
corresponding hunch that restrictions on sexual speech are more likely to be
spurred by hostility to the speech itself than for political speech in general, Justice
Souter's positions seem less incongruous.
D. Abortion Protests
The Court has now dealt thrice with free speech challenges to efforts to limit
protest outside abortion clinics. The Court has long accepted the protection of
orderly movement on public streets as a sufficient justification for time, place,
and manner regulations of speech in the public forum. 97 It has also accepted that
the protection of privacy and repose may also be a sufficient content-neutral
justification for limiting speech in the public forum-for example, upholding a ban
on stationary picketing of residences in Frisby v. Schultz.98
Using variations on standard time, place, and manner analysis, the Court has
found such interests sometimes sufficient and sometimes insufficient to sustain
injunctions against protestors engaged in counseling and advocacy outside
abortion clinics. In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, the Court upheld an
injunction's restrictions on how close protestors could be to the front of a clinic
and how much noise they could make nearby, while striking down as excessively
broad the buffer zone as applied to the back of the clinic, a limitation on the
display of signs, a 300-foot no-approach zone around the clinic, and a similar
buffer zone around the residences of clinic staff.99 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, suggested that intermediate scrutiny should be somewhat
sharper for injunctions than for statutes because "[i]njunctions. . . carry greater
risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do general ordinances.""
In Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, the Court upheld the
portion of an injunction creating a fixed 15-foot buffer zone around a clinic but
invalidated a "floating buffer zone" that required speakers outside the clinic to
97. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
98. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
99. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1994).
100. Id. at 764.
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retreat 15 feet from unwilling listeners when requested.' ' Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas dissented from both decisions insofar as the majority
upheld any aspects of the challenged injunctions. 102
In Hill v. Colorado, the Court for the first time reviewed a statute, as opposed
to an injunction, challenged for limiting the speech of abortion protestors outside
abortion clinics, and upheld it by a vote of six-to-three. 3 The statute made it
unlawful for anyone within the vicinity of a health care facility to "'knowingly
approach' within eight feet of another person, without that person's consent, 'for
the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in
oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person . . . .""' Justice
Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.'15 He found the statute to be a
valid, content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation.1 ° 6 It was content-
neutral, Justice Stevens wrote, because it regulated not speech but "the places
where some speech may occur," it was not adopted because of disagreement with
a message, and it was justified by interests in access and privacy that were
unrelated to ideas. 10 7 Justice Stevens declined to find a content basis in the
distinction between approaches for "protest, education or counseling" and for
other purposes, such as "pure social or random conversation."'0 8 He concluded
that the statute "applies to all 'protest,' to all 'counseling,' and to all demonstra-
tors whether or not the demonstration concerns abortion, and whether they oppose
or support the woman who has made an abortion decision. That is the level of
neutrality that the Constitution demands."'3 9 He went on to hold that the statute
was narrowly tailored to important interests in privacy and access and left
protestors adequate alternative means of getting their message across."'0 Justice
Souter filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, emphasizing that the statute addressed "not the content of speech but the
circumstances of its delivery," and suggesting that it thus was properly evaluated
as content-neutral. "
101. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 378-80 (1997).
102. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 784 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Schenck, 519 U.S. at 385 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
103. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2491 (2000).
104. Id. at 2484 (quoting CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2494.
107. Id. at 2491.
108. Id. at 2492.
109. Id. at 2494.
110. Id. at 2494-95.
111. Id. at 2500 (Souter, J., concurring).
Vigorous dissents were filed (and read aloud from the bench in emotional
perorations that created visible tension among the Justices)" 2 by Justice Scalia,
who was joined by Justice Thomas, and by Justice Kennedy." 3 Justice Scalia
argued that the floating buffer zone around oral communication was "obviously
and undeniably content-based," because "[w]hether a speaker must obtain
permission before approaching within eight feet-and whether he will be sent to
prison for failing to do so-depends entirely on what he intends to say when he gets
there.""14 He would have applied strict scrutiny, which the statute could not
survive:
Suffice it to say that if protecting people from unwelcome communica-
tions (the governmental interest the Court posits) is a compelling state
interest, the First Amendment is a dead letter. And if forbidding peaceful,
nonthreatening, but uninvited speech from a distance closer than eight
feet is a "narrowly tailored" means of preventing the obstruction of
entrance to medical facilities (the governmental interest the State asserts)
narrow tailoring must refer not to the standards of Versace, but to those
of Omar the tentmaker. 115
Justice Scalia bitterly accused the Court of distorting First Amendment law in
order to "sustain this restriction upon the free speech of abortion opponents": " 6
"Does the deck seem stacked? You bet."".7 Justice Kennedy likewise would have
found the law content-based due to its restrictions on particular topics, denying
that "citizens have a right to avoid unpopular speech in a public forum.""8 He
added that, in his view, the statute interfered with an important First Amendment
interest in "immediacy": "9 "The Court tears away from the protesters the
guarantees of the First Amendment when they most need it," that is, "at the very
time and place a grievous moral wrong, in their view, is about to occur."'2 °
The abortion protest decisions are not ordinary time, place, and manner
decisions. Both Madsen and Schenck involved greater judicial intervention than
usual in this area, in contrast to the Court's tendency in other public forum cases
to give nearly plenary deference to the managerial decisions of government when
112. See Edward Walsh & Amy Goldstein, Supreme Court Upholds Two Key Abortion Rights; 'Partial
Birth' Ban Struck Down, 5-4; Clinic Protest Restrictions Upheld, 6-3, WASH. POST, June 29, 2000, at
Al.
113. Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2503-15.
114. Id. at 2503 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 2507.
116. Id. at 2509.
117. Id. at 2515.
118. Id. at 2519 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 2530.
120. Id.
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the time, place, and manner justification appeared genuinely content-neutral. 2'
Hill is unusual in the other way, with the Court giving greater than usual
deference to a law permitting a listener preclearance requirement on speech in the
public forum-a holding inconsistent with the usual rule that, in the public forum,
speakers may take what initiative they wish toward listeners, while offended
listeners must simply turn the other cheek. 22 The law in Hill arguably has a
viewpoint-discriminatory effect: requiring listeners affirmatively to consent to
speech will inevitably have the effect of discriminating in favor of popular or
widely accepted messages and against those that are unorthodox or unpopular. 2 3
The Hill dissenters also raised serious questions whether the Court here had
selectively departed from speech-protective principles out of cultural affinity for
abortion seekers over abortion protestors-a mirror image of the Court's selective
expansions of First Amendment protections for civil rights protestors during the
1960s. 12
4
The real question in the abortion protest cases is not whether, as content-
neutral restrictions, such injunctions and statutes are adequately narrow, but
whether they are properly understood as content-neutral at all. Hill was notable
for the Court's unwillingness to pierce the veil of the law's apparent facial
content- neutrality. This approach was consistent with the Court's deference to
the apparent neutrality of the nudity regulation in Pap's A.M., discussed above,1 25
but inconsistent with the ruling from the same Term in Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe that an apparently neutral invitation to student speech at
the opening of public high school football games violated the Establishment
Clause, because it was truly a thinly veiled effort to showcase student-led
prayer. 26 As that decision showed, Justice Stevens has no blanket rule against
peeking behind a rule's facade of neutrality to show its bias. Yet, Hill showed a
striking readiness to accept the Colorado legislature's effort to draw a facially
neutral statute to achieve goals clearly targeting particular content. After all, the
121. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding prohibition
on sleeping in national parks against challenge by anti-homelessness demonstrators); Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding regulation of concert sound volume in public park).
122. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (invalidating breach-of-peace conviction for
wearing in public a jacket condemning the draft in vulgar terms).
123. In Heffron v. Int'l Socy for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981), the Court rejected a
similar argument against a rule requiring literature distribution and solicitation of funds to be confined to
a fixed rented booth at a state fair. See id. at 649 n. 12 (holding that the argument that "the regulation is not
content-neutral in that it prefers listener-initiated exchanges to those originating with the speaker... is
interesting but has little force").
124. See Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2503.
125. See infra Part H.B.
126. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302-07 (2000).
motivation for this facially neutral law had to do with its effect in shielding
patients (abortion patients) known to be the recipients of a particular kind of
speech (anti-abortion speech). But the inconsistency runs the other way as
well-what of Justice Kennedy's willingness to accept a similarly weak pretense
of neutrality when deployed in Erie, where the naked legislative motivation to
limit nude dancing was held adequately covered by the fig leaf of the "secondary
effects" rationale that Justices Stevens and Scalia alike found scarcely plausible?
III. THE FREE ASSOCIATION CASES
In cases involving First Amendment claims by the Boy Scouts, a group of
California political parties, and students at public universities, the Court last Term
reinforced the principle that the right to speak includes the right not to speak, and
the corollary right to associate for expressive purposes includes the right to
disassociate. Specifically, the Court upheld the right to avoid government-
compelled membership in a group if inclusion of that unwanted member would
alter that group's expressive message.' 27 But not every collective activity
implicates expression, and where it does not, government may compel association
that is unwanted. The Court has held in previous cases that civil rights laws may
compel innkeepers and restaurant owners to admit blacks,'28 and the Jaycees and
Rotary Club to admit women,'29 for an inn, a restaurant, or a commercial
networking organization do not have any intrinsic mission that would be
compromised by the admission of women or minorities. The case would be
different, the Court implied, if a white or male supremacist society were the
organization in question, and indeed the Court later held, in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, that civil rights law may
not be used to force admission of an openly gay marching contingent (GLIB) to
a privately sponsored St. Patrick's Day parade. 30
Which are the Boy Scouts more like, an inn or a parade? In Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, a closely divided Court upheld the First Amendment expressive
association right of the Boy Scouts to exclude an otherwise distinguished
scoutmaster, James Dale, on the ground that he had spoken publicly about his
homosexuality, thus suggesting that the parade analogy was the more apt one. '
3
'
Writing for the five-to-four majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that New
127. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
128. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (inns); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (restaurants).
129. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (Jaycees); Bd. OfDirs. Of Rotary Int'l. v. Rotary
Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (Rotary Clubs). See also N.Y. State Club Assoc. v. City of New
York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (private clubs providing services to nonmembers and to business entities).
130. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 567-77
(1995).
131. Boy Scouts, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2449-51 (2000).
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Jersey may not constitutionally apply its public accommodations law, which bars
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, to require the Boy Scouts to
admit Dale. 132 To support the conclusion that the Boy Scouts' membership
decisions were constitutive of its expression, he cited the organization's governing
statements:
[The Mission Statement Provides:] "It is the mission of the Boy
Scouts of America to serve others by helping to instill values in young
people and, in other ways, to prepare them to make ethical choices over
their lifetime in achieving their full potential. The values we strive to
instill are based on those found in the Scout Oath and Law:"
[The Scout Oath reads:] "On my honor I will do my best to do my
duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law; To help other
people at all times; To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake,
and morally straight."
[The Scout Law provides:] "A Scout is: Trustworthy Obedient
Loyal Cheerful Helpful Thrifty Friendly Brave Courteous Clean Kind
Reverent." 1
33
The Chief Justice deferred to the Boy Scouts' own interpretation of these
statements as entailing the exclusion of outwardly gay scoutmasters. 13 4 While
acknowledging that the terms "morally straight" and "clean" are by no means self-
defining, and that "different people would attribute to those terms very different
meanings," Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that some people "may believe that
engaging in homosexual conduct is contrary to being 'morally straight' and
'clean"' and found it decisive that "[t]he Boy Scouts says it falls within th[at]
latter category." " Overriding the New Jersey court below, he stated that "it is not
the role of the courts to reject a group's expressed values because they disagree
with those values or find them internally inconsistent" and accepted the Boy
Scouts' assertion that "it does 'not want to promote homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior."' 136
Finally, the Chief Justice found that Dale's presence as an assistant
scoutmaster would significantly burden the Boy Scouts' expression; here, as with
GLIB in Hurley, he asserted, "Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very
132. id. at 2449-51, 2454-55.
133. Id. at 2451-52.
134. Id. at 2452-53.
135. Id. at 2452 (citation omitted).
136. Id. at 2452-53 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the
world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
behavior,"' 37 a position contrary to its own interpretation of its beliefs. The Chief
Justice distinguished the Jaycees and Rotary cases as cases in which enforcement
of civil rights statutes "would not materially interfere with the ideas that the
organization sought to express." '38
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
denied that the Boy Scouts had proclaimed any anti-gay philosophy: "It is plain
as the light of day that neither [of the] principles-'morally straight' and
'clean'-says the slightest thing about homosexuality"'39 Nor did he find any clear
statement of such a principle by the Boy Scouts prior to Dale's dismissal." "A
State's antidiscrimination law does not impose a 'serious burden' or a 'substantial
restraint' upon the group's 'shared goals' if the group itself is unable to identify
its own stance with any clarity." 4' He found the parade case fully distinguishable:
"Unlike GLIB, Dale did not carry a banner or a sign; he did not distribute any fact
sheet; and he expressed no intent to send any message."' 42 Justice Stevens
concluded, in pointed words reminiscent of the Hill dissenters' accusation of
ideological bias on the part of the majority in that case: "The only apparent
explanation for the majority's holding, then, is that homosexuals are simply so
different from the rest of society that their presence alone-unlike any other
individual's-should be singled out for special First Amendment treatment.'
' 4 3
Justice Souter filed a separate dissent joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. '4
The Boy Scouts case turned on the question of how to allocate the discretion
to determine the mission of a group, and the Court rested that discretion not with
the government but with the group. The Court held that government may not
second-guess a group's definition of its expressive mission in relation to its
membership, nor may it put a group to a prior comprehensive notice requirement
that would force it to disclose all potential exclusionary practices in advance. "'
Ex post self-definition was found sufficient. 146
How one views the decision normatively will turn on how one regards a
private sphere that deviates from public constitutional values of tolerance and
equality: as a desirable safeguard against centralized homogenization and
orthodoxy like the protection of abstinence from flag salutes in West Virginia
137. Id. at 2454.
138. Id. at 2456.
139. Id. at 2461 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 2461-62.
141. Id. at2470.
142. Id. at 2475.
143. Id. at 2476.
144. Id. at 2748.
145. Id. at 2454-55.
146. Id.
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State Board of Education v. Barnette,147 or as a dangerous backwater likely to
undermine the public values that depend upon the alteration of social norms. The
desegregation of the public schools, for example, might arguably have been
impeded had the civil rights acts not extended integration to inns and housing and
barbecues and lunch counters, as well. The answer may turn on context; in a
world where this decision has prompted both increased membership and
decreased public subsidies and charitable donations to the Boy Scouts, is it closer
to lunch counters or to Barnette? There is a good argument that the extension of
equal protection to gay men and lesbians need not extend all the way down into
every private association in New Jersey in order to be effective and that the right
of expressive gay organizations to exclude homophobes is an important implicit
corollary of the decision.
Political parties, unlike the Jaycees or the Boy Scouts, are funny creatures;
sometimes they are treated like state actors because of their role in the electoral
system (as in the decisions barring parties from operating white-only primaries .48)
and sometimes they are treated like private associations. California Democratic
Party v. Jones treated them robustly as the latter.'49 In that decision, the Court,
by a vote of seven-to-two, struck down a California initiative entitled Proposition
198, which had changed California's partisan primary from a closed primary to
a blanket primary.'5 ° Under the new system, any voter could vote for any
candidate regardless of party affiliation, and the candidate of each party winning
the largest number of votes became the party's nominee.' 5 ' The blanket primary
was challenged by the California Democratic Party, the California Republican
Party, the Libertarian Party of California, and the Peace and Freedom Party, each
of which sought to restrict voting in its party primaries to its own members.'
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia, who had earlier praised the associative
function of parties in his vigorous dissents from First Amendment decisions
protecting civil servants against patronage dismissals, 53 rejected the argument
that primaries are "wholly public affairs that States may regulate freely." ''4 He
proceeded to invalidate the blanket primary system as a violation of parties' right
147. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
148. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that Congress has the right to regulate
primary, as well as general, elections, where primaries are by law made integral part of the election process);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (prohibiting, under the Fifteenth Amendment, the denial of a citizen's
right to vote on the basis of race or color).
149. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402, 2412-13 (2000).
150. Id. at 2414.
151. Id. at2405-06.
152. Id. at 2406.
153. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 94 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2407.
of expressive association under the First Amendment:
Representative democracy in any populous unit of governance is
unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band together in
promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their political
views.
... Proposition 198 forces political parties to associate with-to have
their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by-those who, at
best, have refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have
expressly affiliated with a rival.
... Proposition 198 forces petitioners to adulterate their candidate-
selection process-the 'basic function of a political party'-by opening it
up to persons wholly unaffiliated with the party. Such forced association
has the likely outcome-indeed, in this case the intended outcome-of
changing the parties' message. We can think of no heavier burden on a
political party's associational freedom. Proposition 198 is therefore
unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling stateinterest. 1"'
Applying that standard, Justice Scalia found the state's proffered justifica-
tions wanting. He rejected as inadmissible any interest in "producing elected
officials who better represent the electorate and expanding candidate debate
beyond the scope of partisan concerns" or in drawing in "disenfranchised" voters,
suggesting that such interests "reduce to nothing more than a stark repudiation of
freedom of political association."1-6 He also found constitutionally inadequate any
supposed government interest in promoting fairness, affording voters greater
choice, increasing voter participation, or protecting privacy by means of the
blanket primary device. 157 Even if such interests were compelling, he noted, the
state could further them in a less restrictive manner by operating a nonpartisan
blanket primary, in which voters could pick nominees regardless of party
affiliation, so long as those nominees did not advance to the general election as
any party's nominees. '58
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, suggesting that "[a]
State's power to determine how its officials are to be elected is a quintessential
attribute of sovereignty,"' 59 and that, accordingly, "the associational rights of
155. Id. at 2408-12 (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 2412.
157. Id. at 2412-14.
"158. Id. at 2414.
159. ld. at 2416 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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political parties are neither absolute nor as comprehensive as the rights enjoyed
by wholly private associations."' 60 He insisted that the right not to associate "is
simply inapplicable to participation in a state[-run and state-financed primary]
election." 16' He also would have given more deference to the state's proffered
interests, ranking them "substantial, indeed compelling." 162
How one views this case will turn on how one views the function of parties.
The Court takes a libertarian or pluralist view, seeing parties as serving to
aggregate and more effectively express the political opinions of their members.
If one views parties instead as boss-driven oligopolies that inhibit the expression
of individual electoral choice through entrenchment or capture or mere delegates
of state power who may be subject to any restriction the state likes as a condition
of use of the polls, then of course the dissent's deference to California's political
innovation would appear more appropriate.
Finally, the right to disassociate suffered one defeat last Term, in a case
involving not compelled membership, but rather compelled financial exactions
for use by organizations the contributor would not want to join. The structure of
analysis here was established in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which held
that agency shop members could be compelled to contribute dues to support
compulsory bargaining by a public employee labor union, but not to support
ideological union activities that were "not germane" to its central mission of
overcoming collective action problems in labor negotiations.163 This distinction
was applied in later cases to restrict the use of compulsory state bar dues to
expenditures for bar discipline and legal services, but not other bar activities such
as advancing gun control or nuclear freeze. The Court's most recent application
of Abood was in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., in which the Court
upheld the government's exaction of compulsory fees to support generic
advertisement of stone fruits, reasoning that this exaction was germane to the
purpose of agricultural marketing boards and not likely to "engender any crisis of
conscience. "'64
In the latest First Amendment challenge to a mandatory fee requirement, the
Court upheld a public university's requirement that students contribute to a
student activity fund used in part to support student organizations engaging in
political or ideological speech. In Board of Regents of The University of
Wisconsin v. Southworth, the Court rejected students' attempt to analogize their
160. Id. at 2418.
161. Id. at 2419.
162. Id. at 2422.
163. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977).
164- Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457,472 (1997).
fee requirement to the one invalidated in Abood and the bar cases.165 Justice
Kennedy wrote for a unanimous Court that Abood's "standard of germane speech
as applied to student speech at a university is unworkable," 66 because the
academic freedom mission of the university is so Catholic and broad:
The speech the University seeks to encourage in the program before us
is distinguished not by discernable limits but by its vast, unexplored
bounds. To insist upon asking what speech is germane would be contrary
to the very goal the University seeks to pursue. It is not for the Court to
say what is or is not germane to the ideas to be pursued in an institution
of higher learning. 67
However, Justice Kennedy cautioned that "[t]he University must provide some
protection to its students' First Amendment interests .... The proper measure,
and the principal standard of protection for objecting students, we conclude, is the
requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of funding support." 61 While
upholding the fee program in most respects, he accordingly remanded the portion
of the university's program that allowed activity funding by referendum for further
review regarding viewpoint neutrality. 69 Justice Souter,joined by Justices Stevens
and Breyer, concurred only in the judgment, cautioning that too rigid an approach
to viewpoint neutrality in the university setting might ultimately conflict with
principles of academic freedom. 70
This decision, which in effect requires religious fundamentalists to subsidize
feminist and gay rights groups on campus and vice versa, was foreshadowed by
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, in which, by
holding that an evangelical Christian magazine could not be denied support from
mandatory student fees, the Court conceived of the universe of extracurricular
student expressive activities as a metaphysical public forum rather than as a single
private interest group.' 7' According to that view, students paying a fee are simply
paying a tax for support of diversified expression, with no strand of which they are
likely to be branded by association. And, of course, none of us has an Abood right
to demand opt-out from our taxes, even if we do not like the parades and marches
that they may help to support in the public square. The decision may also have
reflected an unwillingness to have courts enter the thicket of administration of pro
rata refunds, headache enough for union and bar accountants. Indeed, had the
Court gone the other way, the administrative nightmare might have led many
165. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 231 (2000).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 232.
168. Id. at 233.
169. Id. at 235-36.
170. Id. at 236-43.
171. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
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public universities to abandon fee-funded student activities, so the most important
practical outcome of the decision might well be that groups dependent on this kind
of support will continue to exist on campus at all.
IV. CONCLUSION: FIRST AMENDMENT TRENDS IN THE 1999 TERM
The 1999 Term's most surprising feature can perhaps be seen by viewing the
cases in the aggregate: while First Amendment claims are often seen as liberal,
justices frequently labeled "conservative" tended to side, overall, with the speaker
in First Amendment side of cases more often than did many of their so-called
"liberal" counterparts. Indeed, in the Teim's seven First Amendment cases,
Justices Kennedy and Thomas amassed the most consistent record of supporting
private speakers' claims against government infringement: each voted against the
government in five cases, namely Playboy, Nixon, Hill, Boy Scouts and California
Democratic Party. Justice Scalia was the runner-up for the most frequent support
of First Amendment claims, siding with the speaker in four of seven cases, namely
Nixon, Hill, Boy Scouts, and California Democratic Party.
In contrast, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg each voted to uphold alleged
government infringements on speech in five of the seven cases, namely Nixon,
Hill, Boy Scouts, California Democratic Party, and Southworth. This overall
record matched that of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, although
their scorecard differed as they voted for the speaker in Boy Scouts, and
California Democratic Party and the government in Pap's A.M. and Playboy.
And Justice Breyer held the record for the least support for First Amendment
claims, voting to uphold government regulation in every case but California
Democratic Party.
What accounts for this reversal in roles over the First Amendment, long
associated with "liberal" legal ideology? None of the Term's cases concerned
government crackdowns on politically subversive speech; in the 1990s, with the
nation less threatened by security issues than arguably at any time since World
War I, governments may have been less inclined to blatantly test the First
Amendment in order to enforce political orthodoxies. Instead, the values that
government litigants posed as countervailing or trumping the First Amendment
considerations in these cases were frequently those derived from government's
traditional responsibilities and efforts to protect the vulnerable (Hill), regulate
nuisances (Erie and Playboy), and redistribute power either by democratizing
politics (by equalizing political spending) or by promoting a social ethic of
tolerance or nondiscrimination. Where government itself champions liberal values
such as equality, it is perhaps unsurprising that Justice Breyer would find himself
in rough alignment in all but one case (Boy Scouts) with the Chief Justice, who
generally takes a very broad view of governmental regulatory power. And where
litigants advocating strong First Amendment constraints on government are
associated with socially conservative ideological movements (Boy Scouts and Hill)
or with monied commercial interests (Nixon), it is perhaps unsurprising that so-
called conservatives would champion their rights.
This is not to say that the Justices either consciously or inevitably subsumed
free speech interests to background political sympathies. Note, for instance, that
among the Justices voting with the majority to uphold speech-avoiding protections
for abortion patients in Hill was Chief Justice Rehnquist, who has been a vocal foe
of the Court's pro-choice jurisprudence since his dissent in Roe v. Wade itself.'72
On the other hand, voting to strike down the protest-restrictions was Justice
Kennedy-co-author of the plurality opinion preserving abortion rights in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.'73
In other words, a scorecard of votes cannot show First Amendment values to
be inherently liberal or conservative; indeed, free speech is obviously critical to
those across the political spectrum. In shaping First Amendment law, as in
shaping other areas of law, the Supreme Court responds to opposing commit-
ments-free speech among them-that cannot be arrayed along a single ideological
axis.
172. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
173. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
PROFESSOR MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL'S RESPONSE
PROFESSOR McCONNELL: I'd like to pick up on Kathleen's last point about
ideological drift. Her basic idea here is that vigilance for free speech may
have become a conservative principle rather than a liberal principle. I really
don't think that is right, and the truth is much more alarming than that. I
think the free-speech principle ten or fifteen years ago used to be fairly robust.
And I consider the high point of this the flag burning cases, where very solid
majorities of the Court, including some of the most conservative Justices,
voted-correctly, in my view-that laws against flag burning are unconstitu-
tional. I consider this to be kind of a high point where people across the
spectrum were able to agree upon a way of analyzing free-speech claims. And
they would stick to those principles without regard to the political complexion
of the case. And I think this term suggests that that coherence of free-speech
doctrine has truly broken down, and it's broken down in a way'we should be
extremely worried about-Hill v. Colorado' being the centerpiece of this.
I want to compare Hill with the football prayer case, the Santa Fe2 case,
as Kathleen did, in a little more detail. But first I want to emphasize the point
here. Kathleen described Hill v. Colorado as a very, very difficult case. I
think she should have gone farther than that. I think she should have said
that Hill v. Colorado is a case that is inexplicable on standard free-speech
grounds and that it is shameful the Supreme Court would have upheld this
piece of legislation on the reasoning that it gave. And on so many doctrinal
points, those who voted to uphold that statute did so when, in another context
not involving abortion protest, there is not a chance that legislation of this
sort would be upheld. And I was delighted with very much of Kathleen's
presentation, but I would have been very much happier if instead of saying
this is a "very, very difficult case," she had gone one step further. She and I
disagree very much about the underlying question of abortion rights. But I do
not believe that free-speech law should be affected whether you agree with the
speaker or not. And when the Court lines up on free-speech cases according
to whether they agree with the speakers or not, I think we're in very serious
trouble.
Let me mention some of the ways in which Hill v. Colorado departed
from standard First Amendment free-speech analysis. First let me describe
the case. It involved a statute that makes it a criminal violation for people to
engage in entirely peaceful, non-coercive, non-obstructive, quiet speech in a
quintessential public forum; namely, discussing an issue of undoubted public
importance on the public street and sidewalks. We are talking about the
ability to walk up to a person quietly and respectfully and offer them a leaflet.
They don't have to take it. But the question is whether you have an
opportunity to offer them a leaflet or to carry a sign. That's what it's about.
I. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
2. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
I do not dispute for a minute that the state has the authority to protect women
and anyone else entering healthcare facilities from coercive activity, from
obstruction, and even loud and noisy and abusive things that may be
upsetting. I have no doubt at all of that. And I was not upset by some of the
earlier abortion protest cases in which, in the context of an injunction, the
Court issued restrictions on protesters whom courts found abused the right of
free speech to engage in coercive and abusive and obstructive tactics. Those
injunctions went beyond what ordinary citizens have to put up with, but
that's because these people had already shown themselves and been proven
in court to be abusing the right. Hill v. Colorado is about people who have
never done that. We're talking about entirely peaceful people who are simply
trying to communicate an idea to someone on a public street about an issue of
importance.
Now Kathleen covered very well one of the ways in which Hill v.
Colorado inverted ordinary free-speech principles, that is by rejecting the
principle that it is the person-it's the unwilling listener-who has the burden
of action, and not the speaker. In this case, if I'm eight feet away, and that's
approximately my distance here from Professor Kmiec, I have to get
affirmative permission from him before I can move forward and offer him a
leaflet. Ordinarily it is my right as a speaker to speak, and it is Doug's
obligation if he doesn't want to hear me to go the other way. This is the first
major case that I can think of that rejects that. It says the state can presume
that Professor Kmiec does not want to have my leaflet and prevents me from
offering it to him without express particular permission.
Second is the extraordinary breadth of this law in comparison to its
legitimate objectives. Again, the state has an absolutely legitimate purpose
in making sure that women who are going into these facilities are able to do
so while not obstructed and not harassed. But look how much farther the
statute goes than that legitimate objective. If there's any tailoring require-
ment at all, this statute is grossly overbroad.
A third problem, and it seems to me this is so clear, is the abuse of the
idea of content neutrality. The Court said that this statute is content-neutral.
I just literally cannot see how they could possibly come to that conclusion. If
I walk up to Professor Kmiec and I ask him "what time is it" or "what do you
think the weather is like," that's permitted under the statute. If I walk up to
him and say, "do you know what you're getting into in that clinic," then it is
prohibited. You cannot tell, other than by the content of what I say, whether
the law is being violated or not. Now if that is not content-based, I just do not
know what "content-based" could possibly mean.
Now what the Court does is quote, and here I want to agree with Akhil
about precedent being distorted, Ward v. Rock Against Racism,3 a case in
3. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
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which content didn't matter. The Court says in sloppy language that the
question of content neutrality has to do with whether the government is
suppressing speech because of disagreement with its message. But that turns
content neutrality into viewpoint neutrality. Now maybe there might be some
arguments about moving in that direction. I mean, I'd like to see them. If the
Court wanted to move in that direction, they could perhaps make some
arguments, but they didn't do that. The Court simply elided the difference
between content and viewpoint and pretended that this was a statute which
was content-neutral. And then finally, the Court had an extremely naive
attitude toward the formal neutrality of this law. And here I would like to
draw the contrast more sharply between Hill v. Colorado and the Santa Fe
case, the football prayer case, because the two cases are so similar but come
out exactly opposite. Both of them involve formally neutral laws. In Hill, you
have a restriction on speech. In Santa Fe, you have a permission for speech.
Neither case specifies what the message is. In Hill they refer to signs and
leaflets and protest, counseling and education. Now that could be about
anything. Just as in the football prayer case, a message or invocation could
be about anything. If the Court accepts that formal neutrality in both cases,
that's fine. Or if it looks behind the formal neutrality in both cases, that's
acceptable. But it is not acceptable for the Court to look behind the formal
neutrality when it approves of the law and disapproves of the speech and does
not look behind the formal neutrality in the other.
Let's look further at the comparisons. In Santa Fe, the Court made a
great deal of the fact that the words used suggested prayer. Invocation was a
hint of prayer. Now it says invocation or message, but they said the only
specific word used was invocation. That means what they really had on their
mind was prayer. In Hill, the Court refers to protest, counseling, or
education. The word "protest" is as suggestive of the viewpoint of being
against something as the word "invocation" is of prayer. Similarly, in Santa
Fe they made a great deal about the purpose of the law having to do with
solemnizing the football game. That's kind of a sham for prayer, right? But
there was a purpose statement in Hill v. Colorado as well, and the purpose
referred to a balancing of a person's right to protest against certain medical
procedures with another person's right to obtain medical counseling and
treatment.
So the very purpose statement enacted in Hill specifically refers to people
who were protesting against certain medical procedures. How many medical
procedures are there that there are protests about? It's obvious that this is a
statute about one and only one thing: namely, an abortion protest. And yet
the majority says in Hill that this law "applies equally to used car salesmen,
animal rights activists, fundraisers, environmentalists, and missionaries.
Each can attempt to educate unwilling listeners on any subject, but without
consent may not approach within eight feet to do so."'4 Contrast that to the
Court's statement in Santa Fe: "The District nonetheless, asks us to pretend
that we do not recognize what every Santa Fe High School student under-
stands clearly-that this policy is about prayer."' Well, I say every person on
the street at the abortion clinic understands that the Hill statute is about
abortion protest, just as much as the high school students in Santa Fe
understood.
My preference is to resolve both of these cases in favor of the free speech
right. But I could put up with almost either rule. What I can't put up with,
and what I do think we shouldn't put up with, what I think is deeply
shameful, is when a different rule is applied to one kind of speech than
another, simply because of the political preferences of the Justices.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Jan Crawford Greenburg of the Jim Lehrer Newshour now
has questions for you both.
MS. GREENBURG: I'd like to stay on Hill because I think this discussion is just
fascinating and really helpful. Obviously, in Hill Scalia says basically, "the
deck is stacked and we're going to look at regulations differently where
abortion is concerned." Kennedy, as you noted, said their predecessors surely
would never have agreed with restrictions on protests t lunch counters. And
Justice Kennedy said that if this grave error in analysis persists, it will greatly
reduce free and open discourse in public forum. So I would like to open this
up and continue this discussion. Do you all agree that perhaps this is the
most blatantly erroneous case of the term? Do the other panelists agree with
Professor McConnell's very strong remarks?
PROFESSOR TRIBE: Well, I don't know. There are quite a few candidates for
most blatantly erroneous, but it's right up there. I thought Kathleen's
remarks were brilliant and wonderful, but I thought she was milder than she
should have been on Hill, because I don't think it was a difficult case. I think
it was slam-dunk simple and slam-dunk wrong.
Now while I have the floor for a second, let me just say I don't think it's
quite right that this is the first case where the Court, in a free-speech context,
got it backwards in terms of opt-in and opt-out. Unfortunately, I lost the first
such case, and Kathleen worked on it with me. It was a case called Heffron
v. ISKCON6 and it was not as blatant as this one, but basically there was a
rule that said that if you wanted to distribute literature in the state fair in
Minnesota, and it was mostly about religious distribution, you had to do it
from a fixed booth. And I made the argument that the rule meant that you
750
4. 530 U.S. at 723.
5. 530 U.S. at 316.
6. Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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had to, in effect, get permission. That is, if people didn't want to be seen
going into these booths, they'd never get this literature. So you had to let
these people walk around and just hand it out.
This put the burden the other way, as in Lamont,' where you had to
virtually say, you know, "Hello, I'm a commie. I want to get that informa-
tion." The Court gave very short shrift to our argument. Indeed, the entire
treatment of that argument-which was, I thought, the whole argument in the
case-was in one footnote by Justice White in which he said, "the argument is
interesting, but it lacks force."
DEAN SULLIVAN: Which we thought was bad at the time, but years later when
we lost Bowers v. Hardwick8 and Justice White said, "your argument is
facetious at best," we kind of longed for the days of "interesting but has little
force."
PROFESSOR McCONNELL: But at least in that case the government's
justification was not that the person didn't want to receive the literature.
They had other justifications.
PROFESSOR TRIBE: They had other ones, but the dominant one was that people
don't want to be bothered. But I do agree this is worse.
MS. GREENBURG: In light of that, when we're talking about the most
erroneously decided case of the term, is this, as Justice Kennedy raises the
fear, potentially the most grievous in the impact on the law in a free and open
discourse? What's the effect of this going to be?
DEAN SULLIVAN: I don't think so at all. The Court has created a kind of
curtilage rule for houses and abortion clinics which it doesn't really apply
elsewhere in the public forum. Go back to Frisby v. Schultz,9 which upheld
a law the Court construed to be a ban on targeted picketing by people who
were on public forum- property, the streets and sidewalks, but who were
standing stationary outside of homes yelling at the owners. It happened to be
a case in which part of the yelling was abortion protest, but that was just an
accident. The Court has not accepted targeted picketing outside a home. And
similarly, in the line of abortion protest cases, it's created a kind of curtilage.
It's almost a property rule that says that in the physical vicinity of certain
places where people have this interest in privacy and repose-and maybe the
justices are sympathetic, as Nina Totenberg suggested, to an interest in
privacy- this curtilage is protected. And maybe that did drive Reno v.
7. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
8. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
9. Firsby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
Condon, 0 which held that it's okay for Congress to stop states from selling
your driver's licenses to commercial vendors.
It seems to me that's very palatable, and the Court hasn't extended this
sort of opt- in rather than opt-out principle to any other part of the public
forum. So it may be that it's spawned by the abortion controversy, but it
doesn't have that much generative power for the rest of the public forum or
the First Amendment. Usually the Court goes the other way. Look at Reno
v. ACLU," which says that you have to opt out of bad speech on the Internet
by hiring Cyber Patrol or some other filter software instead of having
government keep the indecent speech from coming into your home.
PROFESSOR TRIBE: With all due respect, I don't think this position will
immediately be generalized. I agree the problem is under-inclusivity, not
over-inclusivity, and it might be limited to homes and hospitals, and maybe
only certain kinds of hospitals. But I think, in terms of the civil peace that
was brilliantly exemplified by the union of right and left in the flag burning
cases, and in terms of the way in which that kind of agreement, notwithstand-
ing different ways of viewing the substance of the speech involved, could
generate nearly a decade or more of consensus about free-speech cases, that's
what may begin to break down as a result of the feeling of bad faith that a
case like this generates.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: I'm a dissenting voice on the panel here because
I think the result was correct in this case, but I'm troubled by the rationale
that was given. I think that there is something unique about the area outside
abortion clinics when you look at what goes on there. There is a need to
protect women who are entering these facilities. There's a need to protect
entrances and exits to the facilities, and I think all of the Supreme Court cases
in the last ten years about abortion clinics access have been about this.
Now I wish the Court had written it more explicitly that way, in terms of
compelling interest. Where I become concerned is where the Court tried to
find a content-neutral regulation, and the problem is the whole doctrine of
content neutrality right now is quite confused. You can say that this law is
facially content-neutral. It doesn't specifically identify the topic of the
speech. It doesn't identify viewpoint so it fits as content-neutral. But the
Court is not consistent in saying that you look only at the face of the law.
Think of City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres2 or Erie v. Pap's A.M. 3 where
the Justices say "even though the law is facially content-based, if it has some
other purpose, it will be treated as content-neutral." You could do the same
thing here, but it doesn't make much sense. So I think this case further adds
10. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
11. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
12. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
13. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
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to the confusion about content neutrality, but it's the right decision about a
need to protect people in a very unique environment.
PROFESSOR AMAR: And note the link, Jan, between what Erwinjust said about
watering down the meaning or confusing the meaning of content-based
regulation and what Larry said much earlier about reasonable suspicion.
Larry says instead of basically saying reasonable suspicion means something
different in this place, it is much better to say we've got different rules for
schools, and the suggestion was we might have different rules for hospitals.
But once you hear Kathleen saying it's kind of privacy-based, and she invoked
a Fourth Amendment word, curtilage, broader contexts and ideas of privacy
come into play. The Court should have simply said there are special rules for
special places, like hospitals where very vulnerable people are about to have
a very serious procedure and you shouldn't basically add insult to their injury.
Maybe they don't want to actually have this procedure, but it's medically
necessary. You know, there are all sorts of tragedies that people have, and
there are places basically where they have this right to be left alone. Don't
call it content-neutral though.
A final thought. I do think that just as it may be difficult to actually
regulate the entirety of the world under the Fourth Amendment by insisting
that all searches and seizures have warrants or even probable causes or even
individualized suspicion--think about metal detectors at airports and in
courtrooms and border searches and a million other things--I think it's
actually quite hard to insist on content neutrality, especially because the
Supreme Court's rules themselves are not content-neutral and can't sensibly
be so. So there may be actually something to be said for moving to viewpoint
neutrality as the over-arching standard, to which Michael suggested he was
at least open.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: But I think, as Michael's comments illustrated, this
statute would have a hard time even under a viewpoint-neutrality basis, given
the preamble of that statute which was clearly directed at protests against a
highly controversial medical procedure. Presumably, gathering in praise of
the procedure is all right. Perhaps we're struggling here to devise special
rules for medical clinics and houses, when the Court in this instance does not
deserve the benefit of the doubt.
MS. GREENBURG: Another thing that was picked up in Hill, and it's something.
that Nina mentioned at lunch and various commentators have said, is that
Roe 4 is now hanging by one thread and abortion could be in the balance.
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
And several people have pointed to Justice Kennedy's language, not only in
the Stenberg5 case but also in his dissent in Hill, in which he accuses the
majority of basically violating the spirit of Casey that, where the machinery
of the state is not operative in early term, that it's a moral discussion. And
now the majority in Hill basically said moral debates aren't that important,
even where someone wants to pass out a little leaflet. So do you see Ken-
nedy's comments in Hill as evidence that he may be wanting or willing to
rethink his position in Casey, or is Justice Kennedy, as Dean Sullivan said,
just the most pro-First Amendment Justice on the Court now and he's just
outraged by these developments?
DEAN SULLIVAN: Well, I'll take a flier. I think there's almost no chance the
Court will reverse Roe v. Wade in the near future, no matter what happens to
the appointments. It's not going to go there. It's not going to revisit that.
It's not going to reopen that, understanding Roe to mean the criminalization
of abortion procedures under statutes that would allow women to be
sent-pregnant women to be sent-to jail will not be accepted by the Court.
That doesn't mean that the future Court won't uphold more regulations
of abortion. And after all, Justice O'Connor, who provides the crucial vote
in Stenberg, said you could write a partial-birth abortion ban that she would
uphold, as long as it had enough of an exception for the health of the mother.
So I think that opponents of abortion may get some more victories of a kind
in which the state can have a law actually survive the undue-burden test.
Remember Casey, of course, overruled a whole line of cases invalidating
regulations, but I think the permit-but-discourage-regulation-but-don't-ban
regime is probably the compromise that's here to stay no matter what happens
to the Court. So at most, there can be sort of a marginal shift toward the
anti-abortion side. That's my prediction. I don't know if you agree.
PROFESSOR McCONNELL: I do have a sense that Justice Kennedy may be
desperately trying to be a voice of genuine compromise on the issue of
abortion where the state's power is not being wielded to prevent it, but on the
other hand, where the genuinely serious moral question of abortion is one
which can be fully ventilated in our society without having it shut down. That
seems to me to be a tremendously honorable position.
PROFESSOR TRIBE: I think Kathleen is being too optimistic from the point of
view of a pro-choice person and too pessimistic from the point of view of a
pro-life person. I think one loads the dice when one says "allowing pregnant
women to be sent to jail for having abortions." No, we're not going there. I
do think, with a new Justice replacing somebody like Stevens with views
something like where Kennedy's are right now, we would have a world in
which vastly more restrictions on abortion would be routinely upheld, and the
compromise of Casey is extremely delicate.
15. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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PROFESSOR JAMES: The comments have tracked remarkably well with the
questions, except for one for Professor Sullivan on the Playboy 6 case. What
effect would worldwide broadband access to information have on free speech
law, specifically the government's interest in limiting access to sexu-
ally-oriented speech?
DEAN SULLIVAN: Okay. That's a really important question, and I think that
this is a Court where they don't write with quill pens anymore, but they didn't
start putting URLs in their opinions until very recently. And yet in Reno v.
ACLU, the Court understood the Internet creates an environment in which the
barriers to entry and the cost of transmission of information are dramatically
lowered. This is democratizing. This is a world in which free speech
abounds and in which we should be very slow to recognize any government
power to limit speech here, because there are all these means of self-help in
this kind of metaphysical world of freedom of speech that extends around the
globe. It should be up to the listener to control household by household what
he or she or his or her children listen to, and not up to the government. If
that holds from Reno v. ACLU, it suggests it's going to be very difficult for
the government to put preemptive regulations into place. So I think that so
far the Court's view is going to be somewhat Libertarian in this domain.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: We turn now to our final panel. It is an excellent one. It
is the panel presentation by Dean Varat at U.C.L.A. with regard to the
Dormant Commerce Limitations and the Law of Preemption.
16. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).

